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*Six years after: Reinvigorating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*

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### *1. Introduction: Why do we need the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?*

Six years after the first Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona, where the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was founded, the high expectations accompanying the innovative partnership project have largely disappeared.<sup>1</sup> Even though the institutionalisation of the EMP is progressing steadily, it seems to have contributed little to solving core problems in the region: in the Middle East conflict, war is imminent; among countries bordering on the Mediterranean Sea, the prosperity divide between North and South has been deepening; the number of migrants streaming towards Europe stands almost unchanged; Algeria is being increasingly destabilised; the only countries showing some measure of democratisation are Morocco and Jordan, whereas in other Mediterranean Third Countries (MTCs), repression and despotic rule have become stronger; and organised crime in the region has been dealt with no more successfully than have environmental problems or other so called soft-security issues. Thus, the Mediterranean region is further than ever away from being „a region of stability and prosperity“ (Barcelona Declaration). When the Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Marseille (November 2000) ended without tangible results in the wake of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, it seemed that the EMP had arrived at an all-time low.<sup>2</sup>

The following essay wants to prove this negative stocktaking to be too sweeping and, therefore, inappropriate. The disillusionment after six years of practical experience with the EMP can be explained to a large extent in that the partnership concept was often misinterpreted as a mechanism for rapid problem solutions. Thus, many expectations with regard to the EMP were unrealistic from the start. Only when the long-term and complex EMP design, on the one hand, and its short-term implementation in reaction to particular interests, on the other, have been thoroughly analysed, can a more balanced evaluation be done and urgently needed proposals be developed on this basis to reinvigorate the partnership project. The necessity of reinvigorating the EMP results from the simple fact that, in spite of all its deficiencies, the EMP has no alternative, since it offers the only remaining forum for dialogue and co-operation to the nations of this region full of

conflicts. Such a forum is necessary, as most of the problems in the region can no longer be dealt with at the national level, but only, if at all, in the context of multilateral co-operation. Let us not forget that one of the major reasons for creating the EMP was the awareness of a great variety of interdependencies. However, for a number of reasons yet to be named, the EMP is threatened in its ability to function, if not in its actual existence, so that it will require great efforts of all parties concerned to overcome the deficiencies and make the full potential of the EMP productive.

Since 11 September 2001, the day the USA became victim to a series of incomparable terrorist attacks, this necessity has become more urgent than ever, for September 11 is a turning-point in contemporary history, with far-reaching consequences particularly for Euro-Mediterranean relations due to the Islamic background of the attacks. Samuel Huntingdon's „Clash of Civilisations“ theory, that was never able to gain acceptance in academic discourse because of its essentialist concept of culture, has suddenly become very popular again. It offers a temptingly simple pattern for naming friend and foe in a situation of fundamental disruption. A new polarisation between Western civilisation and Islam as a whole is to be feared, which the EMP can offer indispensable possibilities to counteract.

The terrorist attacks have been taken to be directed not only against America, but against the whole Western world, and rightly so. This, however, is no evidence of an antagonistic conflict between „Western values“ and „Islamic values“. Rather, what is being attacked are *universal* values which Islam naturally shares. Thus, the answer to the terrorist attacks of September 2001 is not a „clash of civilisations“, but the common struggle of a broad coalition against criminal terrorists who give religious gloss to their perverted interpretation of Islam.

This context is underscored by the fact that the EMP aims to overcome putative cultural differences, defining itself as a community of values: In the Barcelona Declaration, all 27 participants explicitly declare their support of democracy and human rights. This declaration might not be too convincing in view of the numerous authoritarian regimes among MTCs<sup>3</sup>. The EMP, according to Western standards, is at most a „community of values in the making.“ Nevertheless, there

can be no doubt that all participant states are positioning themselves clearly against terrorism. Against this background, co-operation in the struggle against terrorism can be expected to develop into a core issue of the EMP. In this framework, joint commitments will not be limited to police and intelligence co-operation alone. Beyond that they will have to address the deeper causes of violence and hatred, that is unsolved local and regional conflicts, economic underdevelopment as well as political repression in numerous MTCs. For all these issues, the EMP has sophisticated instruments available.

A further potential of the EMP, not yet sufficiently exhausted, are its possibilities to phase out old and new enemy concepts. Because of its complex structures, the EMP promotes inter-regional co-operation in many different sectors including all levels of government and society. The conception of the EMP was preceded by the thought that inter-regional co-operation must not be based on a dialogue between governments only, but has to include populations, in particular their democratic forces. The more people work together in concrete projects, the higher are the chances to overcome their misperceptions of one another. That sounds banal. In view of the polarisation to be expected, however, it is an important element for the future shaping of inter-regional relations.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. *The EMP in Theory and Practice*

The EMP was founded in November 1995 on the EU's initiative. With this ambitious project, the EU reacted to destabilisation tendencies in the southern Mediterranean region, which were perceived as threat to Europe's own welfare and security interests.<sup>5</sup> The qualitatively new threat potential, no longer triggered by individual nations and escaping military definitions, was identified to have its main common root in the underdevelopment of most MTCs and in the growing prosperity divide between southern and northern states bordering on the Mediterranean Sea. To tackle these problems at their root, fundamentally new problem solving strategies had become a necessary requirement. The EMP concept stakes on close *co-operation* with MTCs in the areas of politics, economy and culture and on a *normative* orientation of the entire partnership project, thus

proving to be progressive in many respects compared to the patchwork of earlier approaches.<sup>6</sup>

- The complexity of the approach takes into account interdependencies between economic and political stability problems in the region
- The long-term perspective adopted from the Helsinki Process provides for the creation of a stable framework in which lasting problem solving strategies can be developed
- The declared belief in democracy and human rights established a normative point of reference, undermining the principle of non-interference with the domestic affairs of states
- The attested spirit of partnership aims at a fair balance of interests regardless of the imbalance existing in power politics between southern and northern states bordering on the Mediterranean

Frequent reference to the „spirit of Barcelona“ shows this positive assessment to be shared in principle on both sides of the Mediterranean – even if motives differ. However, opinions among all parties concerned are more sceptical whenever the EMP is judged in terms of its *practical* implementation. There are a number of factors that have led to disappointment with the Barcelona process even when expectations were no more than sober. First among these are:

- Structural problems of foreign policy making in the EU's multilevel-system and offences against the spirit of partnership originating in the EU.
- The negative development of the Middle East peace process
- Lacking willingness to co-operate among MTCs themselves
- The lacking political will on both sides to put life into the normative spirit of the Barcelona process

## *2.1 Structural Problems of Foreign Policy in the EU's Multilevel-System and Offences against the Spirit of Partnership Originating in the EU*

The conception of the EMP can be evaluated as a successful example of European policy-making, because its complex approach is appropriate to the intricate problems in the Mediterranean region. But since the EMP has been firmly established, the political will to put life into the „spirit of Barcelona“ seems to be vanishing. The implementation of the EMP is increasingly being dominated by limited particular interests of individual protagonists within the EU:

„Various protagonists within the EU set partial accents according to their function in the Community. For the Commission, success is measured in terms of progress made in contractual relations with partner states to establish a free trade zone. For the Council, political stability criteria are paramount. Depending on their geographic proximity to the region, EU member states expect progress in the opening-up of markets and the stability of economic developments. For the European Parliament, the promotion of democracy and human rights in partner states is a central criterion for the success of the EMP. All protagonists seem to share a tendency to reduce the EMP to various functional aspects.“<sup>7</sup>

Thus, the MTCs must adapt themselves to the different, sometimes even conflicting interests of numerous EU protagonists whom they have to deal with in the context of the EMP. They find that difficult in so far as they can hardly comprehend the complex decision-making procedures, let alone the (formal and informal) balance of powers in the EU multilevel-system. After all, the EMP, in a primary legal sense, coincides with all three pillars of the EU Treaty, especially the first and the second. As the policy areas of each pillar have been integrated to different extents, Mediterranean policy in Europe has found itself in an occasionally precarious area of tension between inter-governmental (second pillar) and supranational (first pillar) decision-making.<sup>8</sup> In view of heterogeneous

interests, on the one hand, and obscure European decision-making procedures on the other, it is difficult for MTCs to discover a clear political sense of direction in Europe's Mediterranean policy.

Hence, it would be the EU's responsibility to ensure greater coherence in its external relations to the Mediterranean region (and not only there). Institutionally, an attempt should be made to integrate the second pillar into the first, to have foreign relations under one common roof. The first pillar includes European foreign trade policy and European development policy; both spheres in which the EU has a positive record of being experienced, professional and efficient. Together they build the core of Europe's identity as a civil power. The second pillar covers Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which is to be complemented by a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the latter still being in an embryonic state. In difference to the first pillar the EU has not yet succeeded in creating a coherent and convincing profile in its CFSP.

Nevertheless and with regard to current reform debates that are going in another direction, integrating the second into the first pillar could only be a long-term goal. The decisive criterion for Europe to gain profile as an international actor is, for the time being, the strengthening of its political will to subordinate particular national and institutional interests to overriding foreign policy goals, in this case the consolidation and further development of the EMP.

Furthermore, it is a disturbing fact that the various EU protagonists usually push through their particular interests at the expense of MTCs and in defiance of the proclaimed spirit of partnership. European dominance is primarily displayed in the area of business and trade which suffers, above all, under agricultural EU protectionism.<sup>9</sup> It is mainly the southern EU member states that want to shield the European market for Mediterranean products against any kind of competition. However, the national interest to maintain trade barriers jeopardises the overriding political goal of the EMP, which is to stabilise the MTCs by supporting their economic development.

Europe's dominance in the sensitive area of foreign and security policies is no less problematic. They are based on the European perception of the southern Mediterranean region as a *region of crisis*. The European security perception

became particularly clear in 1996 when, on the initiative of France, Spain and Italy, two rapid deployment forces were set up, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, which are available to the WEU as well as the NATO for „peace-keeping and humanitarian operations“. It was more than just irritating for the MTCs that, a few months after concluding the EMP, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR were not conceived as a joint Euro-*Mediterranean* security architecture, but as purely European forces, the southern Mediterranean region serving them as a test field for the envisaged ESDP.<sup>10</sup> It was possible to settle the diplomatic conflict relatively quickly, though only superficially.<sup>11</sup> What has remained is, firstly, the MTCs' increased distrust of all unilateral EU initiatives and, secondly, the unsolved problem of a different security perception on either side of the Mediterranean, since the Euro-Mediterranean security co-operation in its present form does not take the Middle East conflict into account – the latter being the primary security problem of MTCs.

This experience cannot but lead to the realisation that the Mediterranean region is extremely unsuitable as a test field for the ESDP. What we need in the Mediterranean region is the development of *shared security perceptions*, including the Middle East Conflict, and the establishment of *multilateral structures of co-operation*, starting with regular information and consultation<sup>1</sup>. As the core problems of the region can not be addressed with military means, it must be clear, however, that military actions may only be taken under the condition that utmost restraint is observed and potential deployments are embedded in an *overall civil strategy*. In this regard, it should be examined to what extent the mechanisms of ESDP's *civil* dimension could be integrated in the EMP. This might be of increasing interest since the joint struggle against terrorism belongs rather in this category and not in the category of military defence.

Regardless of whether it is military or civil, a *unilateral* EU security and defence policy is incapable of solving any of the problems in the Mediterranean region, whereas it does deprive the extremely fragile EMP of its most important working basis: mutual trust.

## 2.2 *The Negative Development of the Peace Process in the Middle East*

When the EMP was founded at the end of 1995, the EU's assumption was that the Middle East peace process had become irreversible. From the perspective of that time, a *window of opportunity* had opened that seemed to facilitate the integration of Middle East policy in the context of a more comprehensive regional policy, thus creating favourable conditions for the consolidation of the peace process. However, when Benjamin Netanjahu took over the government in Israel, unexpected setbacks soon deprived this strategy of its practical basis. Instead of strengthening the Middle East peace process, the EMP was paralysed when the peace process came to a stop. This became conspicuous for the first time in April 1997 at the second Euro-Mediterranean foreign minister conference in Malta when the Arab MTCs expressed unequivocally that returning to the Euro-Mediterranean agenda was unacceptable a few weeks after a Jewish settlement had been built in East Jerusalem.<sup>12</sup>

To avoid a complete blockade of the EMP through further setbacks in the Middle East peace process, the EU decided to leave Middle East policy in the care of Miguel Moratinos, EU representative for the Middle East.<sup>13</sup> Moratinos, whose team is at work in the context of a Joint Action of CFSP, has the function of a regional „Mr. CFSP“ for EU Middle East policy in that he supports a coherent Middle East policy profile of the EU and represents it externally. EU Middle East *policy* thus takes place outside the EMP structures in which EU Middle East commitments are limited to sectoral co-operation and financial aid. This division is also to be found in the Joint Mediterranean Strategy, adopted in June 2000, which will include the Middle East only *after* a comprehensive peace settlement.<sup>14</sup> The usefulness of this division is doubtful: firstly, because it could not prevent an extensive blockade of the Barcelona process in Marseille in the face of increasing violence in the Middle East; and secondly, because excluding the Middle East conflict does not take into account the priorities in MTCs' security concerns. Ultimately, limiting oneself to technical and financial support of the emerging

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<sup>1</sup> See Ortega, Martin: Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence. Contribution to the EuroMeSCo Working Group on the Charter for Peace and Stability, Paris, October 1999.

Palestinian state conflicts with the declared EU goal to strengthen its *political* commitments in the region.

An escalation of the Middle East conflict directly on our doorstep is, indeed, no longer acceptable. Apart from the human tragedy in the region itself, this conflict has the potential to threaten world peace in its entirety. Although the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were not initiated by Palestinians, they confronted the West bluntly with the fact that the unsolved Middle East conflict is at the root of a dangerously worsening hatred of America or „the West“ within the Arab world. The television images of dancing Palestinians in view of the catastrophe in New York and Washington were by no means representative for the entire Palestinian population. Nevertheless, one has to confront the fact that a majority of Palestinians sees the terrorist attacks in the context of their own experience as victims of an occupation policy for which they hold the USA – not unjustly – responsible. This perception is largely shared throughout the Arab world. Whenever the issue of defending Western values is raised in the West, people often fail to see that, for many citizens on the far side of the Mediterranean, the USA have lost their credibility as representatives of these values.<sup>15</sup> The EU, as well, is increasingly risking its reputation, not least because of its dominance within the EMP framework, thus stirring up memories of Europe’s hegemonial policy during colonial times; a trauma that could revive anti-Western or anti-European resentment at any time and that Islamistic movements can easily exploit. The Western community of nations should take this emotional state seriously; thus, it is faced with the difficult challenge of recognising and correcting its own political mistakes – and this in a situation in which America has become the victim of utterly unjustifiable terrorist attacks and needs utmost political solidarity.

For Europeans, this constellation results in a dilemma. On the one hand, they carry the hopes of Arab states which wrote the USA off as a peace mediator ever since the Bush administration had withdrawn from Middle East politics. On the other hand, after the terrorist attacks on the USA, Europe is more than ever obliged to show Atlantic solidarity and will probably have to consider a serious closing of ranks between the USA and Israel. However, America’s need for

support could also result in a *window of opportunities* for the EU. In view of the new constellation, the EU should bring all its influence to bear on the USA, urging them to adopt a more balanced approach towards the Middle East Conflict, to facilitate a joint and active commitment to conflict solving.

Whether such efforts can succeed or not depends to a great deal on the ability of the American government to cope with *critical* solidarity in the new anti-terror alliance. The question arises whether America really has opened itself to multilateralism or whether Europe has to cope with what Curt Gasteyer characterised as a *multilateralism à la carte*. The biggest challenge for the EU, however, is to live up to its own claim that it should have a say in Middle East policy by overcoming national differences on the issue.

### *2.3 The Lacking Willingness of MTCs to Co-operate Among Themselves*

By no means do deficits in the implementation of the EMP come only from the EU; the MTCs are also very slow in fulfilling the obligations they have assumed. This has especially negative consequences in the context of the planned Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone, which is the substantial core of the EMP. Both inter-regional and *intra-regional* networking of trade relations are intended, i.e. south-south-trade. It is mainly thanks to the economic integration process after World War II that Europe's economy was able to grow rapidly; knowing this, the EU expects similar effects from an economic integration in the southern Mediterranean region. Moreover, „expanding south-south-trade would bring considerable economic benefits not only with regard to trade, but also direct foreign investments, since investors would be attracted by the possibility of serving regional instead of just national markets.“<sup>16</sup> These expectations, however, are in contrast to an extremely negative development of trade relations. Since 1995, intra-regional trade has contributed a modest 6% to the total volume of trade in MTCs, and that figure stands more or less unchanged. The Commission has made more than clear in its statement to the Council and the European Parliament (EP), which was drawn up in preparation of Marseille, that it considers, and justly so, the economic integration of the southern Mediterranean

region to be one of the most important means of fighting poverty and underdevelopment. In that statement, the Commission suggests „that every country which signs an association agreement with the EU (should), no later than five years after, sign free trade agreements with all other signatories of association agreements.“<sup>17</sup> In this sense, the EU welcomed Morocco’s announcement that it wanted to get a sub-regional integration project under way together with Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan at the beginning of 2001.<sup>18</sup> In support of this and other sub-regional integration projects, it was agreed in Marseille to introduce the possibility of diagonal cumulation between countries which have identical rules of origin.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to economic aspects, the EU hopes that integrating the southern Mediterranean region economically will have *spill over* effects at the political level. This is based on the experience – in view of the history of European integration yet again – that networking economic and political interdependencies as closely as possible can help to prevent and contain conflicts between states.<sup>20</sup> Since prospects of intensifying co-operation in the Middle East have darkened, hopes in this matter are once again focused on the Maghreb. In fact, there has been an institutional framework for sub-regional co-operation ever since the *Arab Maghreb Union* (AMU) was founded in 1989. Theoretically the EMP could lean on this framework. In practise, however, this has not happened yet, due to the fact that the AMU is not really operational and relations among member states have deteriorated rather than improved since the beginning of the Algerian Civil War in 1992.

A further reason for the marginal UMA role in the context of the EMP is the fact that not all UMA members are automatically EMP members as well. Mauritania, whose relations with the EU were already settled in the Lomé Treaties, is no more integrated in the EMP than is Libya, which the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on in 1992. Delegates from these two countries participated in the first Euro-Mediterranean Conferences merely as members of the UMA delegation, which had been granted observer status. Earlier than Mauretania, which seems to be of less interest for the EU, Libya was regarded as a *potential* partner from the start. Efforts undertaken by the head of state Muammar Gaddafi to return to the international community of nations have been accommodated by the EU even

before Libya's successful support when the hostages were set free in Jolo.<sup>21</sup> Along with the political concept of regional integration, which depends on Libya's participation in order to be realised, it is their own economic interests<sup>22</sup> that make Europeans receptive to Libyan gestures of rapprochement.<sup>23</sup> Thus, a Libyan delegation with observer status was invited for the first time to the third Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Stuttgart in April 1999, and in the Presidency's final conclusion the country was promised full EMP membership as soon as UN sanctions were definitely lifted and Libya accepted the Barcelona *acquis* in its entirety.<sup>24</sup> When Libya received an invitation to participate in the November 2000 Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers in Marseille, it took the lead among those Arab states that first wanted to boycott the conference because of Israeli military actions on Palestinian soil. But then, it confused the hosts by sending a top-class mission to Marseille at the very last moment. Since Libya, thanks to its relative prosperity, does not need to accommodate potential supporters through political good conduct as much as other MTCs, it will remain a difficult and not easily predictable candidate for the EMP in the future. So there still is a lot to be done for the MTCs. The EU should do all it can to support regional integration, by giving incentives on the one hand and by subordinating all competing interests to this overriding goal on the other.

#### *2.4 The lacking political will on both sides to invigorate the normative spirit of the Barcelona process*

The declaration of belief in democracy and human rights was more or less forced upon the authoritarian regimes among MTCs, the EU making that a condition for extended economic co-operation.<sup>25</sup> On the one hand, the EU's authorisation to demand democratic reforms in MTCs feeds on the efficiency that Western democracies have shown up to now in the fields of security and welfare; on the other hand, on the normative value of democracy per se.<sup>26</sup> But the EU is also motivated to pursue external democratisation policies by strong interests of its own – over and above normative authorisation. In the southern Mediterranean region, the EU's democratisation policies can primarily be explained by its *security* interest in being surrounded by as many democracies as possible. According to the theory of „democratic peace“, democracies are comparatively

stable in their domestic policies and are much more likely to solve their external conflicts peacefully than can be expected of authoritarian regimes.<sup>27</sup> It follows that democracies are considered to be more reliable trade partners. Admittedly, this is only true for *consolidated* democracies and not for states which are still involved in democratisation processes; these being exposed far more to the danger of destabilization.<sup>28</sup> As democracies can only gain stability if the democratization process is accompanied by a perceptible and sustained economic development, the EU has linked its democratisation and human rights policies within the EMP closely to economic and financial co-operation. Thus, it also takes into account what development theory has understood: namely that only democracies with a welfare orientation, taking on an active, creative role in the field of economic management, redistribution of wealth, and social security, are capable of establishing or maintaining the social harmony which is necessary for a country's economic and political stability.<sup>29</sup>

It is not surprising that numerous authoritarian regimes among the MTCs have little interest in consistent democratisation processes, as they would, in the long term, jeopardise their own power if they followed them through. What is surprising, however, is the half-hearted commitment of the EU to the goals it has set itself. If one investigates which of the instruments for an active democratisation and human rights policy, built into the Barcelona process, have actually been used in the last six years, the results are sobering. The sharpest weapon supporting democracy and human rights is the *political conditionality* of economic and financial co-operation. The allocation of MEDA funds has not made political conditionality recognisable; neither has the EU used the possibility, so far, to exercise political pressure by (at least partly) suspending an association agreement.

The paradoxical behaviour of leading EU protagonists, to develop new political instruments that are not used afterwards, is not a peculiarity of European policy in the context of the EMP. Rather, the EU generally avoids applying comparable instruments in its development aid projects and prefers less drastic, indirectly effective possibilities of exerting political influence. The reason for this restraint is not so much respect for the declared spirit of partnership vis-à-vis third

countries, as is a target conflict existing, at least temporarily, between the goals of *democratisation* and *stabilisation* – especially with regard to the Mediterranean region. It is highly likely that democratic reforms will produce turbulent transformation processes in most of the MTCs, especially since democratic forces are weak and have no mass basis. The feared crisis scenarios that are being discussed mainly in the southern EU member states range from situations reminiscent of civil war to the democratically legitimised take-over by anti-Western Islamic governments. These destabilisation tendencies, which actually provided the momentum for initiating the EMP, would be strengthened, at least during the period of political transformation. Against this background, it is less surprising that the EU, in the target conflict between democratisation and stabilisation, gives priority to the latter. The EU supports cautious reform processes, but it does not *push* democratization.<sup>32</sup>

Strategically, hopes had first been placed, above all, in economic liberalisation and its expected *spill over* effects at the political level.<sup>33</sup> Until recently, the Commission argued that the liberalisation of markets would make it possible for citizens to decide freely about their economic behaviour as consumers, producers or traders, thus giving them the freedom required to develop competition. Competition, in turn, is one of the most important requirements for the emergence of new middle classes, the potential political protagonists of the future. Since economic freedom and political lack of freedom contradict each other, the expectation is that these middle classes will, in the middle and long term, demand political rights, thus starting a political transformation process, although with a certain delay. The plea for this order of events gets further support from the argument that young democracies are too weak to accomplish structural adjustments, necessary though painful, in the area of economic policy.<sup>34</sup> Such arguments sound plausible, but the question arises why authoritarian regimes should stand up for economic reform processes if, by doing so, they inevitably initiate their own loss of power, however long that may take. Can economic and political transformation function at all, as long as both processes remain under the control of authoritarian and corrupt regimes? Is it not realistic to assume that these regimes will circumvent economic reform processes threatening their power or

react to them with increased state repression so as to nip those political *spill over* effects the EU hopes for in the bud?<sup>35</sup>

The problem can only be solved by means of a carefully balanced *parallelism* of both transformation processes, i.e. by opening the economic system and, simultaneously, granting more and more political freedom in a political system to be gradually reformed. Meanwhile, the Commission seems to have realised this as well. It has turned away from its previous strategy and, in its statement to the Council and the EP in preparation of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Marseille, demands that MEDA country allocations should, in future, depend more strongly on progress in the area of human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law.<sup>36</sup> Another Communication the Commission delivered to the Council and the EP in May, 2001, about the EU's role in supporting democracy and human rights in third countries, points in the same direction. According to this document, higher priority will be placed on human rights and democratisation objectives in the EU's relations with third countries. So-called Country Strategy Papers, assessing the performance of each partner country in the sphere of human rights, democratisation, the rule of law and good governance, are to become decisive instruments for the creation of more coherence in external relations and for the mainstreaming of human rights as a cross-cutting category.

The document also emphasises that the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights is to be carried out primarily in partnership with NGOs and international organizations.<sup>37</sup> The mentioning of NGOs signals that the Commission has decided to reinvigorate its bottom-up-approach of democratisation. The support of civil society in MTCs is an indispensable element of democratisation politics, because institutional reform and rule of law alone are not sufficient; true democracy needs a vivid civil society. Last but not least the democratic forces in the MTCs expect and deserve full European support. Top-down and bottom-up approaches of democratisation have to be used *complementary*, as neither can work without the other.

It is doubtful, however, whether this new tendency (to speak of a change of direction would be exaggerated) will prevail against the background of latest

developments, since short term security interests have gained top priority, once again, after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. This order of priorities could lead to a development in which long-term strategies of stabilisation, starting from the complex causes for problems, are surrendered precipitately to short-term actionism. This is precisely what has to be prevented, because what the Mediterranean region needs is *lasting* stabilisation which cannot be achieved without solving local and regional conflicts, without rebuilding the economy, or without democratisation. The challenge is to develop common defence mechanisms against terrorism in the short term without giving up the long-term stabilisation strategy of the EMP.

### *3. The Struggle against Terrorism in the Mediterranean – „Good“ against „Evil“?*

In the common struggle against terrorism, the MTCs are indispensable, but also extremely problematic partners. One of the problems is the confusion around the term „terrorism“. The MTCs, Israel and the EU are not likely to agree on a common definition that distinguishes clearly between „the struggle for freedom“ and „terrorism“. In this respect, multilateral co-operation in the struggle against terrorism, as provided for in the „Charter for Peace and Stability“ blueprint, does not stand much of a chance. What is likely, however, is stronger co-operation at the bilateral level, i.e. between individual EU member states and individual MTCs (1+1), or at the pluri-bilateral level, i.e. between the EU and individual MTCs (EU+15+1).<sup>38</sup> Israel’s position in these evolving new alliances will be very delicate, as the EU – not to speak about the Arab MTCs - will not share Israel’s radical definition of “terrorism”, equating Yassir Arafat with Osama Bin Laden. But caution is also advised with respect to the mostly authoritarian regimes of the Arab MTCs, because they are also known to interpret the term „terrorist“ generously, including the entire political opposition including democratic civil societies. Moreover, most MTCs that have taken up the struggle against terrorism have shown no respect for the rule of law and violate fundamental human rights. It is to be feared that the EU, in view of the new priority given to its security policy, might in future be inclined to ignore such practices among its partners. This kind

of opportunism would be morally unacceptable – especially wherever the discourse about defence against terrorism goes hand in hand with a discourse about values – and beyond that, it would be counter-productive in that Islamic terrorist organisations find it particularly easy to recruit frustrated young people in precisely those regimes which are authoritarian and corrupt. The example of Algeria should be sufficient to remind us that terrorism cannot be „eradicated“ by means of repression alone. Contrary to what the Algerian regime and its European supporters had originally hoped, this attempt did not stabilise the country either, but aggravated a civil war which has become a potential threat for the entire region.

Against this background, the EU is walking a tightrope in the common struggle against terrorism within the EMP. Since even after the terrorist attacks of September 11 the world cannot be divided into „good“ and „evil“, the EU is compelled to enter into doubtful coalitions with authoritarian regimes in its anti-terrorism defence. The challenge for the EU will be not to abandon its own values in this struggle. In any co-operation with authoritarian regimes, watchfulness is imperative, as is self-control when dealing with Muslims living in one's own country, with migrants and refugees coming legally or illegally, and not least, with the growing number of MTC citizens who want to participate in the co-operative effort of civil societies within the EMP.

#### *4 Perspectives of the Barcelona Process*

The Barcelona process is obstructed by many factors, and those having been discussed above are only the most important ones. This is insofar problematic, as the EMP increasingly has to compete with European reconstruction efforts in the Balkans after the Milosevic-regime was overthrown. For Germany and other Central and North European member states, the Balkans are more important than the Southern Mediterranean, especially since the Balkan states are also potential candidates for EU-membership. Moreover, a growing EU-engagement is also to be expected in the Central Asian Countries, starting with Afghanistan.

A conflict about resources already emerged in the quarrels concerning the budget of MEDA II (2000-2006) that - contrary to previous Commission planning- was not sufficiently increased due to costs incurred in the Balkans.<sup>39</sup> The conflict about resources is not over yet, since the MEDA budget is not finally settled until the annual budgetary proceedings take place. Cuts are by no means impossible. Therefore, if the EMP is to survive, many efforts have to be taken.

First of all, an active EU-involvement in the Middle East should not be postponed any longer. In this respect, the progressive and *joint* diplomatic engagement of numerous European Ministers, aiming at a resumption of the peace negotiations, is a promising development. It remains to be seen, however, if this engagement will develop into a coherent and efficient EU-strategy.<sup>2</sup>

Secondly, the technical implementation of the MEDA program needs to be improved.<sup>40</sup> In this sense, the Commission has already suggested administrative reforms to improve programs for MTC funding, these reforms pertaining mainly to the cumbersome bureaucracy.<sup>41</sup> To persuade MTCs to make greater reform efforts, as well, flexibility models have been put on the agenda, allowing to concentrate MEDA resources on those partner countries or sub-regions that have begun a credible transformation process by signing the association agreement and are seriously trying to achieve reforms.

In view of some MTCs' lacking reform willingness and considering the inadequate sub-regional integration efforts, the advantage of more flexibility cannot be denied, but its chances of success should not be overestimated, either. In Malta and Marseille, the Arab MTCs have made it perfectly clear that, in spite of numerous differences, they do agree on one point: extended regional security co-operation will be refused unless a comprehensive peace settlement is found in the Middle East, because any such co-operation would for the time being only reinforce the status quo which is unacceptable for the entire Arab world. This implies that EU co-operation with smaller groups of states (excluding the participants of the Middle East conflict) would still be confined to Basket two and three in case the Middle East conflict should escalate. However, such a limited co-

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<sup>2</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of the EU's past and future role in the Middle East peace process see Asseburg, Muriel: Der Nahost-Friedensprozeß und der Beitrag der EU – Bilanz und Perspektiven. In: Die Friedens-Warte.

operation would be of little use, since the logic of the Barcelona process is based on the interaction of all three baskets to be able to take into account the interdependencies between economic and political stability problems. Moreover, Europe's Mediterranean policy would run the risk of lapsing back into the rather unproductive sub-regional approaches of the past, or into the no less unsuccessful Euro-Arab dialogue.<sup>42</sup> In both cases, the stability effect would be lost which the founders of the EMP had hoped for once Israel was integrated in inter-regional co-operation. In this regard, an increase in flexibility should be organised in such a manner that positive incentives for reforms and urgently needed (sub-) regional integration processes are created, without provoking a break-up of the group of partner countries including Israel.<sup>43</sup>

In spite of all rightful criticism, holding on to the EMP is justified for two reasons. Firstly, there is no other structure, for the time being, that could fill the vacuum if the Barcelona process were discontinued. In view of the urgent problems in the region, doing nothing is no workable option. Secondly, the EMP is based on a concept the complexity of which is suitable for confronting the intricate and interdependent problems of the region – its consistent implementation provided. That the EMP has continued to exist until now shows the sustained interest of all parties involved and can be traced back to a great deal of little successes in the unspectacular field of sectoral co-operation. Thus, the EMP has already developed the momentum that was contained in the logic of the Barcelona process and that now needs to be strengthened as new challenges surface. To achieve this, it is necessary that all parties involved try to improve technically the implementation of the EMP and, while doing so, remember its ambitious normative principles. This means for the EU to give full respect to the proclaimed partnership spirit and at the same time to improve its instruments to promote democracy and human rights in the region, both being key factors for economic growth and political stability.

#### *Notes*

- 1 This article assumes that the concept of the EMP is well-known. For an overview of EMP-structures and mechanisms, see Jünemann, Annette: Europe's interrelations with North Africa in the new framework of Euro-

- Mediterranean Partnership – A provisional assessment of the „Barcelona-concept“. In: European Commission GD X (Publisher): Third ECSA-World Conference – The European Union in a Changing World, Brussels, 19-20 September, 1996. A Selection of Conference Papers, Brussels, 1998, pp.365-384.
- 2 The Charter for Peace and Stability, which had been worked out under the auspices of the French government, was to be adopted in Marseille, and it was even planned, as the crowning event of the Mediterranean Conference, to enhance the status of the conference to that of a heads-of-state-and-government summit and thus to demonstrate that the EMP is just as important as EU relations to ASEAN or Mercosur. However, against the background of the acute Middle East crisis, this plan was out of the question, and it had to be considered a success that the conference took place at all. See Jünemann, Annette: Die EU und der Barcelona Prozeß – Bewertung und Perspektiven. In: Integration, 2001/No 1, p.42-57.
  - 3 The political systems of individual MTCs, even though they are quite different, have enough in common regarding their democratic deficits to justify the generalising term *authoritarian*. See Kamrava, Mehran: Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalization in the Middle East - a Structural Analysis. In: Third World Quarterly, 19 (1998) 1, p.63. For an in-depth analysis, see Brynen, Rex/Korany, Bahgat/Noble, Paul (publishers): Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World. Vol.1, Theoretical Perspectives, London 1995.
  - 4 The role of civil societies can only be looked at briefly in this article. In more detail, see Jünemann, Annette: Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union: Demokratisierungsprogramme zwischen normativer Zielsetzung und realpolitischem Pragmatismus In: Deutsch-Französisches Institut (Hrsg.): Frankreich Jahrbuch 1997. Opladen 1997, pp. 93-116. The same: The Forum Civil Euromed: Critical Watchdog and Intercultural Mediator. In: Panebianco, Stefania (Ed.): The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs – The Human Dimension of Security as the Key to Stability and Prosperity. Franc Cass, Essex 2001 (in print). The same: From the bottom to the top. The role of transnational NGOs in the political transformation process of North African countries. In: Gillespie, Richard/Youngs, Richard (Eds.): The EU and the Promotion of Democracy: The Case of North Africa. Democratization, Special Issue, Autumn 2001 (in print).
  - 5 Qualitatively new threat potentials that no longer come from states and cannot be defined militarily, either, are considered to be increasing drug trafficking and organised crime, latent and acute regional conflicts, anti-Western Islamic movements, environmental problems, unchecked population growth in MTCs and, not least, the influx of North African migrants.
  - 6 On the genesis of Europe's Mediterranean policies, see Jünemann, Annette: Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und globalen Wandel: Interessen und Zielkonflikte. In: Zippel, Wulfdiether (Ed.): Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU, Baden-Baden 1999, pp.29-63.
  - 7 Köhler, Martin: La Politique Méditerranéenne: Suivi de la conférence de Barcelone. External research project by order of the European Parliament, Brussels 1998, p.1.

- 8 See Monar, Jörg: Die interne Dimension der Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union: Institutionelle und verfahrensmäßige Probleme. In: Zippel, Wulfdiether (Ed.): Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU. Baden Baden 1999, p. 77f. Jünemann, Annette: Auswärtige Politikgestaltung im EU-Mehrebenensystem. Eine Analyse der strukturellen Probleme am Beispiel der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft. In: Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Giesela/Schubert, Klaus (Eds.): Die Europäische Union als Akteur der Weltpolitik. Opladen 2000, pp. 65-80
- 9 On the risks and chances of free trade zones for MTCs, see Bacaria, Jordi/Tovias, Alfred: Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Areas: Commercial Implications. In: Mediterranean Politics, 4 (Summer 1999) 2, Special Issue; Nienhaus, Volker: Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zones: to intensify economic relations and support lasting developments? In: Zippel, Wulfdiether (Ed.): Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU, Baden-Baden 1999, p.101f.
- 10 In the first conception, MTCs appeared neither as partners of a common security architecture nor as citizens who might have to be rescued from natural disasters, but merely as a potential theatre of operations for evacuating European nationals. See Communiqué commun annonçant la signature de l'EUROFORCE opérationnelle rapide (EUROFOR) et de la Force maritime européenne (EUROMARFOR) (Paris, 15 mai 1995). In: Documents d'Actualité Internationale, No 13, 1er juillet 1995, p.407.
- 11 Spain, Italy and Portugal decided to involve selected MTCs in EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR operations under certain conditions. The scenarios that were discussed included rescue operations from natural disasters; a constructive proposal that was also incorporated in the draft of the Charter for Peace and Stability. See Echeverria, Carlos: Co-operation in peacemaking among the Euro-Mediterranean armed forces, Chaillot Papers 35, Paris 1999, p.35.
- 12 See Jünemann, Annette: Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft vor der Zerreißprobe? Eine Bilanz der zweiten Mittelmeerkonferenz von Malta. In: Orient 38 (1997) 3, pp.465-475.
- 13 See Research Group on European Affairs, University of Munich (Ed.): Europe, the Middle East and North Africa: The Barcelona Process in Danger? Working paper presented to the Fourth Kronberg Middle East Talks of the Bertelsmann Foundation, Kronberg, March 15-17, 1998, p.9.
- 14 See Joint Strategy of the European Union for the Mediterranean Region, article 5. In: Agence Europe, 28 June 2000, p.2.
- 15 Sanctions against Iraq and the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol are perceived in the same context.
- 16 Intensifying the Barcelona Process. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament in preparation of the Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers. In: Agence Europe, 14 September 2000, p.11.
- 17 Ibidem
- 18 See Agence Europe, 30 October 2000, p.10.
- 19 See Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Guidelines for the Future, Art. 22, §5.
- 20 See Miller, Gary: An integrated communities approach. In: Journal of Arab Affairs. Special Issue: The EEC and the Arab World. 12 (Spring 1993) 1, pp. 53-100.

- 21 On 23 April 2000, the Filipino rebel group Abu Sayyaf abducted a group of European tourists and Malaysian hotel employees to the island of Jolo. Some of the European tourists were set free in August/September after mediation efforts of the Libyan negotiator Azzarouk.
- 22 Since American sanctions against Libya are still in place, European companies expect to have an advantage in the race for the Libyan market. In contrast to the other MTCs, Libya is a wealthy country and can invest a lot of money to make up for its delayed development of ten years. See Europe gets a foot in Libya's door. In: the Middle East, 1.11.2000, p.12f.
- 23 See Chimelli, Rudolf: Auch Lösegeld bringt Dividende. Libyens Staatschef Gadaffi will auf dem Umweg über Jolo zurück ins weltpolitische Geschäft. In: „Süddeutsche Zeitung“, 28.8.2000, p.4.
- 24 See Foreign Office of the FRG: Third Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Presidency's formal conclusions, Stuttgart, 15 and 16 April 1999, press release, Bonn, 16 April 1999.
- 25 Jünemann, Annette: Democratization – Reflections on the political dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In: Xuereb, Peter G. (Ed.): The Mediterranean's European Challenge. European Documentation and Research Centre, University of Malta, Valetta 1998, pp. 89-118.
- 26 See Internationale Politik, Themenheft Demokratie und internationale Politik, 53 (1998) 4.
- 27 See Rummel, Reinhardt: Libertarian proposition and violence within and between nations. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29 (1985) 3, pp. 419-455.
- 28 See Hartog, Michael: A two way approach to stability in the Arab Mediterranean coastal states. Theories on democracy and international co-operation applied to developments regarding political stability in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Nato Fellowship Final Report, 1998. <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/f96-98.htm>
- 29 See Boeckh, Andreas: Entwicklungstheorien – Eine Rückschau. In: Nohlen, Dieter/ Nuscheler, Franz (Eds.): Handbuch der Dritten Welt, Bd. 1, Grundprobleme, Theorien, Strategien, 3. Aufl., Bonn 1992, pp. 110-130. On the interrelation between democratisation and development see i.a. Leftwich, Adrian: Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World. In: Third World Quarterly, 14 (1993) 3, pp.605-624.
- 30 See November 1999 – November 2000: Eight International NGOs assess five years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Press release of Amnesty International, International Federation of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, World Organization Against Torture, Penal Reform International, Reporters Without Borders, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Marseille 10.11.2000.
- 31 Since 1991, so-called human rights clauses have been included in all economic and co-operation agreements with third countries. See European Commission: Considering how the principles of democracy are to be safeguarded and human rights respected in agreements between the EU and third countries. Communication to the Council and the European Parliament. In: EU Bulletin, supplement 3/95, pp.7-21.
- 32 In this context, the term „dynamic stability“ was created in an official paper of the Spanish foreign ministry in 1995. See Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1995: 463,664, quoted in Gillespie, Richard: Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med Partnership Initiative. In: Mediterranean

- Politics, Vol. 2, Summer 1997, No. 1, Special Issue on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, p.42.
- 33 See interview of the author with Dr. Eberhard Rhein, European Commission, GD IB, Head of Directorate A – southern Mediterranean region, Middle East, Brussels, 4.3.1996.
  - 34 See in detail: Luckham, Robin/White Gordon (Eds.): Democratisation in the South – The Jagged Wave, Manchester/New York 1996.
  - 35 Clearly, the Tunisian government is following the second of these strategies. On the one hand, the country is considered to be exemplary in the economic reform process; on the other hand, retrogressive steps are to be noted in the democratisation process, particularly with regard to the human rights situation. See The State of Liberties and Human Rights in Tunisia. Report published by the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Copenhagen 1999. <http://euromedrights.net/>
  - 36 See Intensifying the Barcelona Process, loc.cit., p.9.
  - 37 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on The European Union's role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries, Brussels, 8 May 2001, COM(2001)252 final.
  - 38 Euro-Mediterranean co-operation in fighting terrorism is no political novelty, at least at the bilateral level. See Shpiro, Shlomo: Terrorism, Media and Intelligence Co-operation. In: Jacobs, Andreas/Masala, Carlo (Eds.): Hannibal ante portas? Analysen zur Sicherheit an der Südflanke Europas. Baden-Baden 2000, p.143-160.
  - 39 The Parliament is trying to finance support in the Balkans without giving up its Mediterranean aid. Agence Europe, 25 October 2000, p.9.
  - 40 The negotiating position of those who advocated strengthening the EMP was damaged by the news that MEDA I, while having achieved good results in *allocating* funds in the period from 1995 to 1999, only managed to *pay out* 26% of those funds by September 2000. Some newspaper commentators gave such a negative assessment of the slow-moving MEDA funds that they called in question the EMP altogether. See Scheerer, Michael: Virtuelle Zahlen. In: „Handelsblatt“, 20.9.2000, p.9.
  - 41 A proposal to increase the efficiency of funding, which had already been included in the consolidated text of MEDA II, provides for the introduction of national and regional strategy papers that can be used in indicative programs as a point of reference. „These Strategy Papers will have the purpose of defining the long term objectives of co-operation and of identifying priority areas of intervention.“ Consolidated Text of the MEDA II Regulation, General Secretariat of the Council, DG F, Directorate V, Brussels 23 October 2000, art.5, §2.
  - 42 On the rather unsuccessful early attempts to establish a European policy for the Mediterranean, see Jünemann: Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und globalen Wandel, loc. cit.
  - 43 The EU-membership candidates Turkey, Cyprus and Malta would not be lost to the EMP, even after accession.